All the meticulous plotting to avoid Ukraine’s Orange Revolution 
resulted in -- Russia’s very own coloured one. But Russia is not 
Ukraine, discovers Eric Walberg
Russia’s electoral scene has been transformed in the past two months, 
without a doubt inspired by the political winds from the Middle East and
 the earlier colour revolutions in Russia’s “near abroad”. Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin’s casual return to the presidential scene was 
greeted as an effrontery by an electorate who want to move on from 
Russia’s political strongman tradition, and to inject the electoral 
process with ballot-box accountability.  
Putin’s legendary role in rescuing Russia from the economic abyss in the
 1990s, staring down the oligarchs, reasserting state control over 
Russian resource wealth, and repositioning Russia as an independent 
player in Eurasia (not to mention in America’s backyard) -- these signal
 accomplishments assure him a place in history books. He and Dmitri 
Medvedev are considered the most popular leaders in the past century 
according to a recent VTsIOM opinion poll (Leonid Brezhnev comes next, 
followed by Joseph Stalin and Vladimir Lenin, with Mikhail Gorbachev and
 Boris Yelstin the least popular). He will very likely pass the 50 per 
cent mark in presidential elections 4 March, despite all the protests 
during the past two months calling for “Russia without Putin”. So why is
 he back in the ring?
It appears he was caught by surprise when the anti-Putin campaign 
exploded in November, fuelled by his decision to run again and the 
exposure of not a little fraud in the parliamentary elections in 
December. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
 opposition was able to unite 
and stage impressive rallies, one after 
another. Despite the chilling Russian winter, they keep coming -- this 
week saw four gathering around Moscow, totalling 130,000. 
The opposition poster children even include Putin’s minister of finance 
Alexei Kudrin. Presidential hopefuls are Communist leader Gennadi 
Zyuganov (backed for the first time by the independent left forces), 
nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, A Just Russia’s Sergey Mironov and the
 oligarch playboy Mikhail Prokhorov -- none of whom stand a chance of 
defeating Putin. This time there are 25 televised debates which began 6 
February among the contenders, who are sparring with each other and 
“Putin’s representative”. 
Is this quixotic march back to the Kremlin heights a case of egomania? 
Or is it a noble attempt to both cast in stone Russia as the Eurasian 
counterweight to an increasingly aggressive US/NATO, and shaking up the 
domestic political scene to make sure it will not slump into apathy when
 he himself passes the torch? And if things go wrong, is this Russia’s 
very own White Revolution, long feared by the Russian elite, and long 
coveted by Western intriguers?
Russian politics has always confounded Western observers, and continues 
to do so. Putin is famously imperious and gets away with it. He taunted 
the opposition by saying he thought the original demonstrations were 
part of an anti-AIDS campaign, that the white ribbons were condoms. But 
he nonetheless sanctioned the largest political opposition rallies in 
the past 20 years. 
US democracy-promotion NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy
 -- a key player in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution -- are active in 
Russia’s opposition, but Putin is clearly gambling that Russians can see
 past US efforts to manipulate them. Besides, the winners in the Duma 
elections were the Communists and nationalists, with pro-Western 
liberals placing a distant fourth -- hardly the results NEDers would 
have wanted.
He is also famously willing to tell US politicians they wear no clothes 
-- the latest, last week in Siberia: “Sometimes I get the impression the
 US doesn’t need allies, it needs vassals.” Russian foreign policy is 
now firmly anti-NATO, both with respect to the West’s misguided missile 
system and its eagerness to turn Syria into a killing fields. Rumours 
that a Russian Iran-for-Syria deal with the West have proved empty. 
There are even hints that Iran may still get its defensive S-300 
missiles from Russia in exchange for Russian access to the downed US 
drone. Iran claims to have four already and recently announced they have
 developed their own domestic version.
Pro-Putin rallies are almost as large as the opposition’s, with an 
official count of 140,000 attendees at the festive gathering Saturday. 
The Putinistas even bill theirs as the Anti-Orange rally. “We say no to 
the destruction of Russia. We say no to Orange arrogance. We say no to 
the American government…let’s take out the Orange trash,” political 
analyst Sergei Kurginyan exhorted at Moscow’s Poklonnaya Gora war 
memorial park. Putin thanked organisers, commenting modestly, “I share 
their views.”
The real reason for Putin’s return is due to the failure during his 
first two terms of his “sovereign democracy” to limit corruption in 
post-Soviet Russia. Instead, of producing a modernising authoritarianism
 along the lines of post-war South Korea, Putin’s rule deepened 
corruption -- the bane of late Soviet and early post-Soviet society. 
Instead of trading political freedom for effective governance, he 
clipped Russians’ civil and political rights without delivering on this 
vital promise. Neither did he end collusion between the state and the 
oligarchs. That was the handle that badboy Alexei Navalni used to 
catalyse the opposition around his slogan that United Russia is the 
“party of swindlers and thieves”. 
This was the scene in the 2000s in Ukraine, where it was possible for 
the NEDers to undermine the much weaker Ukrainian state and install the 
Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko in 2004. However, instead of 
addressing the problems that led to the Orange Revolution, Putin 
focussed on foreign threats to Russian political stability rather than 
paying attention to domestic factors, creating patriotic youth 
organisations such as Nashi (Ours) and the 4 November Day of Unity 
holiday – the latter quickly hijacked by Russia’s nationalists. 
But Russian fears of Western interference are hardly naïve. Russia was 
sucked into the horrendous WWI by the British empire, suffered 
devastating invasions in 1919 and 1941, and another half century of the 
West’s Cold War against it. Further dismemberment of the Russian 
Federation is indeed a Western goal, which would benefit no one but a 
tiny comprador elite, Western multinationals and the Pentagon. 
Putin’s statist sovereign democracy – with transparent elections – might
 not be such a bad alternative to what passes for democracy in much of 
the West. His new Eurasian Union could help spread a more responsible 
political governance across the continent. It may not be what the NED 
has in mind, but it would be welcomed by all the “stan” citizens, not to
 mention China’s beleaguered Uighurs. This “EU” is  striving not towards
 disintegration and weakness, but towards integration and mutual 
security, without any need for US/NATO bases and slick NED propaganda. 
The union will surely eventually include the mother of colour 
revolutions, Ukraine, where citizens still yearn for open borders with 
Russia and closer economic integration. The days of dreaming about the 
other EU’s Elysian Fields are over. The hard, cold reality today has 
bleached the colour revolutions, making white the appropriate colour for
 Russia’s version of political change.
Of course, the big problem -- corruption -- is what will make or break 
Putin’s third term as president. At the Russia 2012 Investment Forum in 
Moscow last week, Putin outlined plans to move Russia up to 20th spot 
from its current 120th in the World Bank index of investment 
attractiveness, by reducing bureaucracy and the associated bribery. 
“These measures are not enough. I believe that society must actively 
participate in the establishment of an anti-corruption agenda,” he 
vowed. Reforming the legal system and expanding the reach of democracy 
will be key to fighting corruption, not just via presidential decrees, 
but through empowering elected officials and voters. He confirmed this 
in his fourth major pre-election address this week by promising to 
provide better government services by decentralizing power from the 
federal level to municipalities and relying on the Internet.
So far things look good. For the first time since 1995 there will be a 
hotly contested transparently monitored presidential election, with the 
distinct possibility of a runoff (unless the new US Ambassador Michael 
McFaul keeps inviting NED darlings to Spaso House). The sort-of 
presidential debates, large-scale opposition rallies and the new 
independent League of Voters intending to ensure clean elections are a 
fine precedent, making sure that this time and in the future there will 
be an opportunity for genuine debate about Russia’s future.
Despite all attempts to forestall Russia’s colour revolution, it has 
begun -- Russian-style -- with no state collapse, but with a new 
articulate electorate, wise to both Kremlin politologists and Western 
NGOlogists. Its final destination is impossible for anyone to predict at
 this point.